The Indus Waters Treaty—long considered an unequal water‑sharing arrangement between India and Pakistan—had effectively functioned as a one‑sided extension of the idea of Aman ki Asha – cum Tamasha. This dynamic continued until the Modi government chose to suspend both the treaty’s implementation and the associated goodwill efforts, citing the absence of reciprocity from Pakistan. On 5 January 2026, Union Power Minister Manohar Lal Khattar conducted inspections of several hydropower projects along the Chenab River.
On the first day of his two-day visit, Minister Khattar visited the Salal Power Station in the Reasi district. The Power Minister directed the officials of the National Hydroelectric Power Corporation (NHPC) to expedite silt removal from the reservoir to enhance storage capacity and optimise water utilisation.
Later, Manohar Lal Khattar visited the Kishtwar district, where he laid the foundation for the dam concreting works of the 850 MW Ratle Hydropower Project. He directed the project team to uphold top-quality construction and safety standards to ensure the project is completed on schedule.
On the following day, the minister reviewed the progress of three major projects under the Chenab Valley Power Projects (CVPP): the 624 MW Kiru, the 1000 MW Pakal Dul, and the 540 MW Kwar hydroelectric projects. During his interactions with officials, Khattar instructed them to ensure the commissioning of the Pakal Dul project by December 2026 and the Kiru project by March 2028.
Taking to X, Minister Khattar shared, “An inspection and review of the Kiru (624 MW) and Kwar (540 MW) hydroelectric projects in Kishtwar was conducted. Necessary directives were issued to officials and engineers to ensure that work on these two major projects is completed with the highest standards of quality, safety, and within the stipulated timelines. These projects will not only set new benchmarks in green and renewable energy generation in Jammu and Kashmir but will also drive regional development, improve infrastructure, and create both direct and indirect employment opportunities for local communities.”
Amid the suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty, India is accelerating hydropower development in the upper Chenab basin to strengthen energy security, maximise the use of its water resources, and prevent Pakistan from continuing to benefit from what India views as an unfair share of its waters.
Signed on 19 September 1960 in Karachi, the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) between India and Pakistan was facilitated by the World Bank as a neutral third party. This landmark water‑sharing agreement governs the utilisation of the Indus River system by the two countries. Concluded between Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and Pakistan’s President Field Marshal Ayub Khan, the treaty divided the waters of six Himalayan rivers into two groups: the eastern rivers and the western rivers.
Under this allocation, the eastern rivers—the Ravi (originating in Himachal Pradesh), the Beas (flowing through Himachal Pradesh and Punjab), and the Sutlej (originating in Tibet and passing through India into Pakistan)—were granted for India’s exclusive use. Meanwhile, the western rivers—the Indus, Chenab, and Jhelum—were allocated to Pakistan, with limited rights given to India for non-consumptive and specific uses such as hydropower, irrigation, and transport.
Under the now‑suspended Indus Waters Treaty (IWT), India had rights over roughly 20% of the total annual water flow of the Indus system—about 33 million acre‑feet (MAF) or 41 billion cubic meters (BCM). Pakistan, on the other hand, received the remaining 80%, amounting to nearly 135 MAF or 99 BCM of water each year.
The treaty granted India only limited, non‑consumptive rights over the western rivers (Indus, Chenab, and Jhelum), primarily for purposes such as run‑of‑the‑river hydropower generation, navigation, and domestic use. However, it strictly restricted India from stopping, storing, or significantly altering the flow of these rivers in a way that could affect water availability downstream in Pakistan.
India, meanwhile, fully utilises the waters of the eastern rivers for hydropower generation, irrigation, and various developmental needs. The western rivers—Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab—remain critical for Pakistan’s irrigation network, hydropower capacity, and overall water security, with the Indus River often described as the country’s lifeline.
Although the signing of the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) in 1960 was hailed as a landmark step toward cooperation, the agreement was widely viewed as asymmetrical, as Pakistan received a significantly larger share of the total water flow due to its allocation of the western rivers. Despite the treaty’s intended role in promoting stability, hostilities soon followed, with Pakistan initiating armed conflict with India just five years after the treaty’s conclusion—an episode that ultimately resulted in Pakistan’s defeat.
Over the decades, Pakistan has repeatedly invoked the treaty to advance its claims over the Indus River system. Following multiple Pakistan‑sponsored terror attacks since 1960—and especially in the wake of the April 2025 Pahalgam attack—India reassessed its approach. Ultimately, it suspended the Indus Waters Treaty and proceeded with Operation Sindoor, signalling a decisive shift in its policy regarding water security and cross‑border engagements
India’s suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT) has been met with strong reactions from Pakistan’s political and military establishment, which continues to demand the restoration of the treaty and has raised the issue before the International Court of Arbitration. Despite such pressure, the Indian government has maintained its position and is moving ahead with strengthening hydropower and water‑management infrastructure across the Indus basin.
Over the years, India has taken significant steps to maximise the utilisation of its share of Indus system waters, particularly after the 2016 Uri attack. This has included accelerating infrastructure on eastern rivers and optimising permissible use of the western rivers under the treaty framework.
In May 2018, Prime Minister Narendra Modi inaugurated the Kishanganga hydropower project on the Jhelum tributary in Jammu and Kashmir. Designed to generate over 300 MW of power and irrigate more than 30,000 hectares of land using around 0.65 MAF of stored water from the Ujh River, the project moved forward despite Pakistan’s objections. Construction had originally begun in 2007.
The Ratle Hydropower Project, a joint venture between NHPC (51%) and the Jammu & Kashmir State Power Development Corporation (49%), is another major initiative. Implemented through Ratle Hydroelectric Power Corporation Limited, it is an 850 MW run‑of‑the‑river scheme on the Chenab in Kishtwar. Featuring a 133‑metre gravity dam and an underground powerhouse with four 205 MW Francis turbine units, Ratle is expected to generate more than 3,100 GWh annually. Pakistan had earlier raised objections in 2017 concerning pondage and spillway design, but India maintained full compliance with run‑of‑the‑river norms. Following the IWT suspension in 2025, construction work has gained momentum.
For decades, India allowed substantial volumes of eastern river waters to flow into Pakistan unused due to limited storage infrastructure. This changed with the completion of the Shahpurkandi Barrage in 2024, which diverted about 1,150 cusecs of water to Jammu & Kashmir and Punjab. Previously completed projects—Bhakra on the Sutlej, Pong and Pandoh on the Beas, and Thein (Ranjitsagar) on the Ravi—along with the Indira Gandhi Canal and the Beas–Sutlej link, now enable India to utilise nearly 95% of eastern river waters.
Soon after the 2025 Pahalgam terror attack, India initiated work to enhance reservoir capacity at the Salal and Baglihar hydroelectric projects, where no expansion had occurred since their commissioning in 1987 and 2008–09. These upgrades were previously restricted by the IWT but are now progressing under the treaty’s suspension.
The government is also reviving the long‑pending Ujh multipurpose project in Kathua, a tributary of the Ravi. The plan includes hydropower, irrigation, and drinking‑water components, as well as a second Ravi–Beas link designed to divert surplus water into the Beas basin through a barrage and a tunnel system.
In June 2025, India outlined an ambitious inter‑basin water‑transfer plan to utilise its full share of Indus waters. A 113‑km canal is undergoing feasibility assessment to divert surplus flows from Jammu & Kashmir to Punjab, Haryana, and Rajasthan. This canal would link the Chenab with the Ravi–Beas–Sutlej system and integrate 13 existing canal structures across northern India, ultimately feeding the Indira Gandhi Canal. This would help stabilise water availability across these states amid climate variability.
Meanwhile, the 390 MW Dulhasti Stage‑I project, operational since 2007, is now being expanded after years of delay. In December 2025, the Ministry of Environment granted clearance for the 260 MW Dulhasti Stage‑II project in Kishtwar. The new stage involves diverting Stage‑I discharge through a separate tunnel into a horseshoe‑shaped pondage, along with a surge shaft, pressure shaft, and an underground powerhouse with two 130 MW units.
Progress on many such projects had long been hindered by treaty‑mandated restrictions, extensive information‑sharing requirements, and Pakistan’s repeated invocation of dispute‑resolution mechanisms. Pakistan consistently objected even to run‑of‑the‑river projects, claiming they could influence flows during lean seasons.
Between 2023 and 2024, India issued notices seeking modifications to the treaty, citing Pakistan’s refusal to resolve issues related to the Ratle and Kishanganga projects, as well as the need to account for demographic shifts, environmental requirements, and climate‑driven changes. Diplomatic engagement continued until the 2025 Pahalgam attack, after which India adopted a more decisive stance.
The Indus basin is central to Pakistan’s economy—contributing around a quarter of its GDP, supporting key crops such as wheat, rice, sugarcane, and cotton, and providing 20–30% of its electricity through hydropower. Pakistan relies on the basin for about 75% of its renewable water supply, irrigating 80–90% of its farmland. With falling per‑capita water availability and a growing national water crisis, Pakistan faces increasing pressure.
Any significant reduction in flows from the Indus, Jhelum, or Chenab would have serious implications for Pakistan’s agriculture and food security in the coming years.
For decades, India’s hydropower development in the Indus basin remained constrained by IWT‑imposed storage limits, with only 33 projects in planning or construction generating around 20–30% of potential output. With the treaty now suspended, India is working to fully harness its share of Indus system waters and unlock the basin’s complete hydropower potential.