The Chittagong Hill Tracts (CHT) of Bangladesh—bordering Tripura, Mizoram, and Assam—are once again demanding the attention of India’s strategic community. What was once seen as a distant conflict now presents itself as a slowly widening fault line whose tremors could easily travel across India’s Northeast.
For nearly three decades, New Delhi has largely viewed the CHT question as Dhaka’s domestic matter. But the region’s evolving security landscape, its growing militarization, and the presence of multiple armed networks linked to Bangladesh, Myanmar’s Arakan region, and India’s own Northeast raise a deeper question: Can India continue to afford indifference?
The 1997 CHT Peace Accord, signed under Sheikh Hasina’s government, promised autonomy, justice, and land rights to the indigenous hill communities. Yet the accord remains only partially implemented. Discontent simmers among the Chakmas and other tribal groups, who continue to grapple with land alienation, demographic displacement, and an intrusive military presence.
Despite the formal end of the Shanti Bahini insurgency, peace remains fragile. Land disputes persist, civil institutions remain weak, and allegations of human rights violations continue. Stability, the very goal of the accord, remains elusive.
The CHT’s geography alone should make India wary. It sits at the intersection of Bangladesh, Myanmar, and India—a corridor vulnerable to illegal migration, human trafficking, and insurgent movements. In such a sensitive ecosystem, any administrative vacuum invites exploitation by non-state actors and regional rivals alike.
Speakers at the recent All India Chakma Students’ Union (AICSU) conference in Guwahati underlined these concerns with unusual urgency. They warned that rising instability could not only trigger refugee flows into India but also revive extremist activities involving Rohingya-linked groups or anti-India elements. That possibility, if ignored, would have direct implications for Northeast India’s security.
The CHT’s troubles did not begin yesterday. During Partition, despite its 95% non-Muslim population, the region was awarded to East Pakistan. The Kaptai Dam project of the 1960s uprooted nearly a lakh indigenous people, many of whom fled into India. The post-1971 settlement of landless Bengali Muslim populations, coupled with military protection, dramatically altered the area’s demographic balance and ignited decades of armed resistance.
The scars of the 20-year conflict—from 1977 to 1997, which claimed over 30,000 lives—remain visible. The district councils in Rangamati, Khagrachari, and Bandarban still lack regular elections, undermining local governance and trust.
For Bangladesh, the path to lasting peace begins with sincere and complete implementation of the 1997 accord. Partial steps and selective reforms will not restore confidence among the hill tribes.
For India, strategic silence is no longer a prudent option. Acknowledging the concerns of the hill communities is not interference in Bangladesh’s sovereignty; it is recognition of a shared regional security risk. Ensuring a stable neighbourhood aligns directly with India’s own national security priorities.
The CHT crisis is not merely an ethnic grievance or a governance failure—it is a regional flashpoint in the making. If all stakeholders act with wisdom, transparency, and political will, the region can still be steered toward peace.
But if complacency prevails, the cost will be borne not just by the indigenous communities of the CHT, but by the broader stability of India’s Northeast.